IDAHO NATIONAL ENGINEERING ENVIRONMENTAL LABORATORY PUBLIC MEETING

Test Area North Comprehensive Remedial

Investigation/Feasibility Study Proposed Plan

FINAL AS OF NOVEMBER 18, 1999

February 26, 1998 Moscow, Idaho 7:00 p.m.

Nancy Schwartz Reporting 2421 Anderson Street Boise, Idaho 83702 (208) 345-2773

1	IDAHO NATIONAL ENGINEERING	Page 3
1 2	ENVIRONMENTAL LABORATORY PUBLIC MEETING	1 projects is open until March 12, so we have roughly
3	·- ·· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	2 two weeks to go in that comment period.
		3 The agencies plan to sign a Record of
5		4 Decision on both of those projects some time this
] ₆	West hose Verbb Commishered to Demodes	5 summer and any remediation activities as a result
1	Test Area North Comprehensive Remedial	6 of that Record of Decision will begin, probably,
7	Investigation/Feasibility Study Proposed Plan	7 next year.
8		8 The purpose of tonight's meeting, for
9	FINAL AS OF NOVEMBER 18, 1999	9 those of you that have been before us, is really
10		10 three fold. First, we're here to present the
11		11 results of the 30-month investigation for
12		12 Test Area North; second, we're here to encourage
13		13 you to ask questions about the project and the
14		14 proposed plan and interact with our project
15		15 managers, which some of you have been doing
16	February 26, 1998	16 already; third, we're here to listen to your
17	Moscow, Idaho 7:00 p.m.	17 concerns and receive your comments, both orally and
18		18 written comments. We have a comment form on the
19		19 back of the proposed plans that are postage-paid,
20		20 so you can write your comments on that, fold the
21		21 page and send it to us.
22		22 Your comments will be considered by the
23		23 agencies and responded to in the Responsiveness
24	Nancy Schwartz Reporting 2421 Anderson Street	24 Summary section of the Record of Decision.
25	Boise, Idaho 83702	25 We have a court reporter here tonight,
	Page 2	Page 4

MOSCOW, IDAHO, THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 1998

1 2 3

MR. SIMPSON: Welcome. I'm

4 Erik Simpson, the INEEL community relations plans

5 coordinator for the environmental restoration

6 program.

I think with such a small crowd, I would

8 like to keep it relatively informal tonight. We're

9 here to discuss the results of the Test Area North

10 Comprehensive Remedial Investigation/Feasibility

11 Study and subsequent proposed plan.

12 This is the fourth Comprehensive

13 Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study completed

14 under our Federal Facility Agreement and Consent

15 Order, which is our legally binding clean-up

16 agreement between the Department of Energy,

17 Environmental Protection Agency and state of

18 Idaho. We have five more comprehensive

19 investigations under way, and we will be releasing

20 proposed plans on those projects during the course

21 of the next five years.

We were in Moscow about a month ago to

23 discuss and accept comments on the Naval Reactors

24 Facility and Argonne National Laboratory-West

25 proposed plans. The comment period for those two

1 who will be recording all portions of this

2 meeting. And I will talk about that when we have

3 the comment period.

At the back of the room, I notice that

5 some of you are already looking at those

6 documents. We have several other environmental

7 restoration program documents. We have the Federal

8 Facility Agreement and Consent Order. We have the

9 Community Relations Plan. We have several fact

10 sheets. We have the INEEL Reporter, and we also

11 have proposed plans for Test Area North, Naval

12 Reactors Facility and Argonne National

13 Laboratory-West.

14 With that, I think I will introduce

15 everyone who is here tonight. We have Mark Shaw.

16 Mark is the Department of Energy Waste Area Group 1

17 manager. Mark has been involved in this

18 investigation for about two years. We have Doug

19 Burns. Doug is with Lockheed Martin Idaho

20 Technologies Company, and he was instrumental

21 in conducting the risk assessment for this

22 comprehensive investigation. We have Dave

23 Michael. Dave is the project manager for the

24 comprehensive investigation. He's also with

25 Lockheed Martin. Then also in the audience we have

10

Page 7

Page 8

Page 5 1 Tim, who is the -- or was the Waste Area Group 1 2 manager for Lockheed Martin, and he has taken a job 3 elsewhere in the company but is here tonight in 4 case you have questions about the investigation. With that, I would like to introduce one

6 of your agency representatives. We have Cody 7 here. He is with the State of Idaho Department of 8 Health and Welfare Division of Environmental Quality. He will say a few statements.

10 MR. CODY: My name is Clyde Cody. I 11 work with the Division of Environmental Quality in 12 Boise, Idaho. I just want to say that we think 13 this is a good plan. We've worked with DOE and the 14 EPA on this plan for -- well, I have been involved 15 in this since about two years ago. My background 16 is a hydrogeologist, and I kind of worked into this 17 waste area group management position. We got to 18 this stage with the proposed plan, but we feel it's 19 now time for the public's input, and we're 20 interested in hearing what everyone has to say 21 tonight, so thanks.

22 MR. SIMPSON: With that, I would like to 23 ask Mark to come up here and give us a brief 24 background of Test Area North and a little bit 25 about the comprehensive investigation.

MR. SHAW: To get oriented here, Test

2 Area North sits in the north central portion of

3 INEEL. The one here just means it's been

4 designated Waste Area Group 1.

TAN has a pretty interesting past.

6 It all started back in 1954 when President

7 Eisenhower heard a rumor that the Russians were

8 building a nuclear-powered airplane. He decided if

9 they are building one, we better build one too. So

10 we started the Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion Program

11 and sited it out in the Arco desert.

12 This is the hanger that they built for 13 the plane. They never actually built the plane.

14 but they did build a couple engines for it, which

15 were tested out at this facility. This is the

16 Initial Engine Test Facility. It no longer exists,

17 but that is what it looked like about 10 years

18 ago. After the nuclear powered airplane program

19 finished up, the emphasis shifted to reactor

20 research. This is the Water Reactor Research Test

21 Facility where they tested pool and table type

22 reactors.

23 If we go back to this first one for a 24 minute, you can see this is the Loss-of-Fluid Test

25 reactor where they did experiments on cooling water

1 losses on reactor cores.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Are those ponds the

3 LOFT leach pits or ponds?

MR. SHAW: Those are part of the SMC

5 projects, Specific Manufacturing Capability, that

6 is the project that is currently inside the

7 hanger. That is where they built tank armor for

8 the M1-A1 Abrams tank. They make that armor out of

9 depleted uranium.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Is that still an

11 ongoing program?

MR. SHAW: Yes. This is just kind of a

13 big-picture view of all of the Test Area North.

14 The hanger sits out here. The white dome is the

15 LOFT reactor. A lot of activities has gone on

16 over the years which led to releases to the

17 environment. We all know the standards back in the

18 '50s and '60s weren't up to today's standards.

19 When we started this investigation two

20 and a half years ago, the goal was to find all the

21 potential release sites. So we looked at every

22 facility at TAN, all the activity facilities, all

23 the inactive facilities, abandoned facilities. We

24 found 94 potential release sites. Of those 94,

25 31 were addressed in a previous Record of Decision

Page 6

1 in the Operable Unit 1-07B Record of Decision.

2 Some of you may know that as the TAN groundwater

3 Record of Decision.

Of the remaining sites, eight have an

5 unacceptable risk for human health, that is really

6 what we're here to talk about tonight. Two sites

7 have unacceptable risk for ecological receptors.

8 And the remaining 53 sites are recommended for No

9 Further Action. What I would like to do is kind of

10 take the tour of those eight sites that have the

11 unacceptable risk for human health.

12 The sites are really divided up into

13 three categories, the first of which is the

14 nonradiologically contaminated soils. And the

15 first two of these sites are both burn pit sites.

16 If you look real close, you can see a depression

17 here, which is one of the burn pits. This kind of

18 gives you a little better picture. This is the

19 other burn pit site.

The burn pits is where they would take

21 things like construction debris, pallets,

22 two-by-fours, waste, paint, solvents, turpentine,

23 that kind of stuff, dig a pit, put the stuff in the

24 pit and at the end of the day, they would burn it

25 to dispose of it. A sampling has shown that there

15

19

18 the risk assessment.

3 area also.

Page 11

Page 9

1 is still some lead in the soil.

The next nonrad soil site is the mercury 3 spill site. Back in 1958 when they were moving one 4 of the airplane engines, they managed to spill from 5 800 to 1000 gallons of mercury along the railroad 6 tracks. These reactors were shielded with

7 mercury. They cleaned up most of it at the time.

8 but didn't get all of it. We went back in - I

9 think it was '93, and did a removal action where

10 the tracks were taken out, the ties were all taken

11 out. This area was excavated down about four feet

12 and backfilled with clean soil, but verification

13 sampling shows there is still mercury remaining. And the last of the nonrad soil sites. 14

15 this is the diesel spill site. There were two

16 diesel tanks, one sitting over here and another one

17 over here and about 90 feet of pipe joining them.

18 The pipe leaked, contaminating the soil in that

19 area. The tanks and the piping have all been

20 removed, but there is still contamination

21 remaining.

22 Let's see, the next category of sites 23 are the rad soil sites, both of which are on this

24 picture here. The first one is called the Area B,

25 which is the area south of the turntable. The

Page 10

Page 12 1 some No Further Action determinations where we

1 the tank were contaminated when the tanks were

These are the two tanks that I showed

2 overfilled, so there is soil contamination in the

5 earlier on the other slide. These are the PM-2A

6 tanks. These are two 50,000 gallon carbon steel 7 tanks. They sit this way. Back in the '70s they

8 were pumped as dry as you could get them, which

9 means within about an inch of the bottom. The

12 the tanks to absorb up the inch of liquid in the

13 bottom. Like I said earlier, there is some soil

14 contamination around the tanks from the spill.

16 we're talking about, the eight sites. Doug is

10 waste in them at the time was similar to what was

11 in the V-Tanks. Diatomaceous earth was blown into

That should give you a picture of what

17 going to come up and go into some more detail on

20 to start off with a summary of the investigative

21 process that we have been through at Test Area

23 preliminary investigations that identified

MR. BURNS: First of all, I would like

22 North. As Mark mentioned, we started off with some

24 94 potential contaminant release sites at Test Area

25 North. These preliminary investigations lead into

2 found some of these sites did not contain any

3 contamination. It also lead into several removal

4 actions that were taken. These actions were taken

5 to sites that had the highest potential for

6 producing human health impacts. These were sites

7 where we could readily remediate, take some

8 remedial actions. The removal actions included,

9 for instance, the mercury spill site cleanup that 10 Mark mentioned.

11 There was a buried bottle site, like a 12 settling bottle, that type of thing that were

13 buried. We cleaned those up.

14 There was also an injection well at Test 15 Area North that sits on the southern end of the

16 Test Area North. This well, back in the

17 1950s, '60s and '70s, injected contaminated liquids

18 into this well down into the aquifer. These

19 contaminated liquids formed a plume spreading out

20 from that well. And it also left some contaminated

21 sludge down in the bottom of this well. It was one

22 of your removal actions. Actually, the first

23 removal action that was taken at the INEEL back in

24 1989 involved taking this contaminated sludge out

25 of the bottom of this well. But we still have a

1 railroad turntable sits right there and we're 2 talking about this triangular area here. It was

3 contaminated from the area across the street right

4 here, which I will talk about in a minute. These

5 are the PM-2A tanks. There was a spill back in --6 I think it was 1972 when transferring the contents

7 of those tanks into a tanker truck contaminated the

8 soil in this area, at least in the eastern end of

9 the state. The wind always blows this way. It

10 blew contamination across the road and into this 11 area. Removal action was done, but there is still

12 five small areas along the road here and a couple

13 others out there with cesium-137. And the other

14 rad soil site, if you look down at the bottom, this 15 is the disposal pond. This is the part of the berm

16 that the pond extends on down. It's about 35

17 acres, and five acres in this upper corner here are

18 contaminated with cesium-137 and possibly

19 radium-226. 20

The last category are the tank sites. 21 These are the V-Tanks, V-1, 2 and 3. V-9 sits just

22 off the picture over here. These are three 10,000

23 gallon stainless steel tanks. V-9 is a 400 gallon

24 tank. These tanks contain a listed hazardous waste 25 with metals, PCBs and rads. And the soils around

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1 contaminated plume that exists underneath the Test 2 Area North.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Can I ask, what is 4 your treatment volume, like gallons per minute on 5 the pump and treat on that now?

MR. GREEN: It's 100 hundred gallons per 7 minute. We're running a facility that averages 8 about close to 90 percent of the time.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you. 9

10 MR. BURNS: These removal actions, no 11 further determinations, are all rolled into this 12 Comprehensive Remedial Investigation/Feasibility 13 study. That is a large document. It's a standard 14 document for the CERCLA evaluation process. In 15 that document all of the release sites are 16 summarized, all of these risk from those release

17 sites present calculations, risk results for those 18 release sites.

19 The proposed plan that we're here to 20 talk about tonight is a summary of this large 21 document, the RI/FS. The proposed plan is part of 22 this decision phase where we're asking for public 23 input. We're also asking for agency input, and 24 we'll address public and agency comments and come 25 to a final decision for Test Area North. This

Page 13

1 on just a release-site-by-release-site basis. You 2 need to evaluate the whole populations across the 3 INEEL.

So the remedial actions that we're

5 talking about tonight are principally identified by

6 the human health analysis. So the human health 7 risk assessment in turn had two parts. First of

8 all, we assess risk for an occupational worker. We

9 assessed a current occupational worker risk to

10 workers who are presently working on the site. We

11 also assessed risk for workers who might work at

12 the sites, these contaminated sites, in 100 years

13 in the future. The reason that we chose 100 years

14 is because that is the point in time where we

15 expect DOE to give up institutional control of the

16 INEEL. The next portion of the human health

17 assessment was a hypothetical residential scenario

18 where we assessed risk to a hypothetical resident

19 who might move to the Test Area North, one of these

20 contaminated sites, in 100 years after

21 institutional control.

22 As part of the risk assessment, we 23 evaluated various exposure pathways. Exposure

24 pathways are, basically, means by which

25 contamination can move from the environment and

Page 14

1 decision will be recorded in a Record of Decision 2 that will be a legal document that establishes

3 DOE's actions, what DOE will do to clean up the

4 Test Area North.

So this decision phase will lead into 6 remedial design and remedial action phase and could

7 lead to monitoring some of our release sites and

8 maybe No Action determinations at other release 9 sites.

10 The next six slides I'm going to show 11 you are summaries of the risk assessment that was 12 performed for the Test Area North. This risk 13 assessment consisted of two parts. There was a

14 human health analysis and an ecological risk

15 assessment. As Mark mentioned, the human health

16 analysis identified eight release sites that have

17 unacceptable human health risks. There are also

18 two release sites that had unacceptable ecological

19 risks. The two ecological risk sites are being 20 rolled into an INEEL-wide ecological risk

21 assessment. The reason that we have to do that is

22 because ecological risks, they present impacts to

23 populations of plants and animals. In order to 24 evaluate those impacts, you have to evaluate the

25 entire population. And you can't do that analysis

Page 16 1 enter a human's body. For instance, humans might

2 inhale contaminated dust, might ingest contaminated

3 soil. For each one of these exposure pathways that

4 are shown on this diagram, we calculated risk for

5 each contaminant that have been detected at each of

6 our release sites. So we have multiple risks for

7 multiple contaminants by multiple exposure pathways

8 that are all summarized in the RI/FS.

The contaminants of concern that were 10 identified by the risk assessment are those shown

11 on this slide. First of all, we had a couple of

12 radionuclides that stood out, specifically

13 cesium-137 and radium-226. These contaminants show

14 up principally the TSF disposal pond and soil

15 contaminations that are also contained in --

16 specifically, cesium is contained in the tank

17 sites. We had metal contamination, specifically

18 mercury contamination of the mercury release site.

19 We have lead contamination at the burn pits, and

20 manganese and arsenic contamination that showed up

21 at the disposal pond.

22 We had diesel contamination at the

23 WRRTF diesel spill site. This diesel 24 contamination, again, it's subsurface

25 contamination. We had organic chemicals that

Page 20

Page 17

1 showed up. These are principally chlorinated

2 solvents. They are contained in our tank sites.

3 Also along with the organic chemicals we have

4 polychlorinated biphenyls that have shown up at our

5 tank sites, PCBs that have shown up.

6 AUDIENCE MEMBER: In your plan that went 7 out, it suggested in there that the radium-226 is

8 naturally occurring. Do you know what that is a

9 daughter product of?

MR. BURNS: Radium-226?

11 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Is a daughter product

12 of uranium-238.

13 MR. BURNS: Which is also naturally

14 occurring.

10

15 AUDIENCE MEMBER: It's also not

16 likely -- it's more likely that that is a daughter

17 product of a waste dump there than if it is

18 naturally occurring.

19 MR. BURNS: What we have is, we have

20 taken 41 samples within the disposal pond. Those

21 are the samples from within the pond. We compared

22 those sample results against 260 samples that have

23 been collected across the INEEL at uncontaminated

24 sites across the INEEL. The population of the 41

25 sites matches the population of 260 samples with a

1 95 percent confidence, a statistic confidence. As

2 far as we can tell with the sample results that we

3 have right now, the radium-226 appears to be

4 naturally occurring, but we're going out to collect

5 more samples within the disposal pond to try to

6 verify that assumption. Dave will be talking a

7 little bit more about those samples.

The next three slides summarize the

9 actual risk results that were calculated in the

10 risk assessment. Now, this slide specifically

11 shows the results of the occupational exposure

12 scenario that we conducted. What this graph is

13 showing on this scale here, these are risk

14 results. Let's imagine, first of all, that we have

15 a release site where a worker who was working at

16 that site had one chance in 10 of developing cancer

17 as a result of working at the site for a long

18 period of time. That is a one chance in 10 of

19 developing cancer over his or her entire lifetime.

20 If we had a site like that, the risk for the site

21 would fall right here at the one in 10 level. This

22 graph is showing us that the maximum calculated

23 risk for any of the release sites at Test Area

24 North follow the one in 1,000 risk level.

EPA has established an upper bound of

1 the acceptable risk range as a risk of one in

2 10,000. So this graph shows that we have several

3 sites that fall above this acceptable risk level in

4 the unacceptable risk range. These sites include

5 the PM-2A tanks, the V-Tanks, the soil

contamination area and the disposal pond.

We should also mention that there are

8 three sites at Test Area North where all the

9 contaminants at these sites do not have toxicity

10 values, so we could not calculate risks at these

11 sites. What we did at this these sites was we

12 collected samples and compared the samples results 13 against other regulatory limits. For example, the

14 burn pits had lead in them. We have detected

15 concentrations of lead that exceed a residential

16 clean-up standard of 400 PPM. So as a result of

17 that exceedence, we identified the burn pits as

18 also having unacceptable contamination present.

19 This slide summarized the residential

20 exposure scenario. It's a very similar graph.

21 Again, we have risk on the left axis, but under the

22 residential exposure assumptions, we have several

23 more sites that pop up with unacceptable risk. We

24 have, again, the V-Tanks, the PM-2A tanks, the

25 disposal pond, soil contamination area, but also

Page 18

1 the mercury spill site has an unacceptable risk 2 under the residential assumptions.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: How do you assume that

the mercury and the lead get into the people to

5 cause the problem?

6 MR. BURNS: Well, the mercury -- again,

7 we evaluated risk from all those exposure routes. 8 inhaling of dust, eating the contaminated -- or

9 soil contaminated with mercury or lead. There

10 were several different exposure routes that we

11 evaluated. For the mercury, specifically, we also

12 evaluated -- we assumed a resident might grow a

13 garden in the mercury contaminated soil. Mercury

14 bioaccumulates in plants. As a result, the

15 concentration that a person might eat in a garden

16 vegetable could probably be higher than if the

17 person ate directly the soil that the garden was

18 grown in. It's that exposure route that really

19 drives our mercury risk. We also evaluate all

20 those exposure routes for lead. But, again, lead

21 doesn't have toxicity values. It doesn't have the

22 information needed to calculate a risk result like

23 we do for other contaminants. So we compare our

24 lead concentrations against other standards besides

25 risk standards. Did that answer your question?

Page 21 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah, you actually 2 have real data on the uptake of mercury by 3 different plants? MR. BURNS: Different plants are 5 actual -- there are different studies that evaluate 6 by bioaccumulation, how much lead bioaccumulates. AUDIENCE MEMBER: Of mercury. MR. BURNS: Of mercury, I'm sorry. That 8 9 is right. Mercury is a pretty important 10 contaminant across the county, so there have been 11 lots of studies that have been conducted on that 12 contaminant 13 MR. CODY: Some of the remediation 14 efforts have dealt with using plants for uptake of 15 mercury and then harvest the plants and then 16 dispose of them. I think grape seed is one that is 17 used for canola oil. That is one that is well 18 known for uptaking mercury. It was news to me, 19 too, when I first learned about it. 20 MR. BURNS: One thing to point out about

21 this mercury spill site is that this spill happened

22 back in 1958 and all the mercury feeds, the actual

23 element of liquid mercury was cleaned up at that

24 time. The mercury that is left in the soil is now

25 complex with the soil. It's complex with various

1 ions. We don't actually have liquid mercury in the

Page 23 1 site was exactly equal to the acceptable level, we 2 would come up with a calculated hazard quotient of 3 one. Sites that produce more exposure than the 4 acceptable level fall in the unacceptable region of 5 the hazard quotient analysis. As you can see from 6 this graph, we have several sites that have 7 unacceptable hazard quotients by our risk 8 assessment. The mercury spill site is the site 9 with the highest unacceptable hazard quotients, and 10 we also have the disposal pond, the soil 11 contamination area, the V-Tanks and the PM-2A 12 tanks. 13 So that summarized our risk assessment. 14 Are there any other questions about risk 15 assessment? 16 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Just a comment. There 17 is no known relationship between mercury toxicity 18 and carcinoma in humans. 19 MR. BURNS: Right. 20 AUDIENCE MEMBER: As such, it would not 21 change your assessment any, but your slides are 22 wrong.

MR. BURNS: Well, the mercury spill

24 site, you're saying that the risk slide that showed

Page 22

23

25 the --

2 soil, so plants growing in that soil can actually 3 take the mercury out of the soil and bring it into 4 the plant material. They are actually growing in 5 soil rather than the liquid mercury. This final slide shows the results of 7 the noncarcinogenic portion of our risk 8 assessment. The first two slides showed risks 9 associated with people developing cancer as a 10 result of being exposed to the site. This slide deals with other health risks 11 12 besides cancer. Now, the scale on this graph is 13 slightly different. EPA has performed many tests 14 for various chemicals that identify levels of 15 exposure that do not produce any noncarcinogenic 16 health effects. For most contaminants there is a 17 level that you can intake without causing any harm 18 at all, any noticeable impact at all, so that 19 is an acceptable level of exposure for a given 20 contaminant. What a hazard quotient is, the hazard 21 quotient is the calculation that is performed that 22 is noncarcinogenic risk assessment. The hazard 23 quotient is simply the ratio of an exposure that

24 would be produced by one of your sites compared to

25 this acceptable level. So if an exposure from our

Page 24 AUDIENCE MEMBER: I'm saying that the 2 slide that showed the risk of carcinoma development 3 should not include mercury. MR. BURNS: That is right. This is the 5 mercury spill site, though, we have identified 6 other contaminants besides mercury. AUDIENCE MEMBER: Then put down the 8 contaminant that you're talking about. If you're 9 talking about mercury, you're talking about 10 mercury. If you're talking about PCBs, you're 11 talking about PCBs. There is a marked difference. MR. BURNS: Absolutely. You're 13 absolutely right. There is no carcinogenic impact 14 for mercury that has been identified. 15 AUDIENCE MEMBER: As I say, it doesn't 16 change your outcome. 17 MR. BURNS: That is right. The outcome 18 is still the same since we have the unacceptable 19 hazard quotient. 20 AUDIENCE MEMBER: It goes out to the 21 liver, doesn't it, mercury? AUDIENCE MEMBER: It's a neurotoxin, 23 kind of like lead. People get confused and lose 24 their memory and have seizures and die. I think, maybe, that is the reason there

1 is no known malignant change. If you get enough 2 mercury, if you get any kind of malignant change 3 you're dead. I don't know. I just pulled that out 4 of my pocket.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: It's sort of similar to the uranium exposures, like at Fernald. It wasn't really a carcinogenic problem, it was a liver that was the real risk driver.

9 MR. BURNS: I think uranium, being a 10 heavy metal, it can cause other problems besides 11 carcinogenic impacts.

Next we will have Dave Michael come up and start explaining a little bit about our remedial action that we're proposing as part of this proposed plan.

15 this proposed plan.

16 MR. MICHAEL: So far tonight part of our

17 discussion tonight has been on the history of the

18 site. We talked about how we did the initial

19 evaluations. We mentioned that we had eight sites

20 that had risk associated with those sites that were

21 unacceptable. Then we just had the discussion

22 about risk. The next portion of our discussion

23 tonight -- we just want to present to you the

24 remedial alternatives that we've looked at and

25 provide to you the ones that we feel are the best

Page 27
1 wanted to prevent the uptake of mercury -- and as
2 we had the discussion awhile ago for the homegrown

we had the discussion awhile ago for the homegrow.
produce for a future resident.
For the underground storage tanks,

5 whatever we do, our goal would be required to be
6 that we would prevent any release of the tanks'
7 contents to the environment. We have had no known

8 release of the tank contents that are in these

9 tanks now. Whatever we do, we need to make sure 10 that we don't release the contents.

The last group that I'm going to just mention briefly is a co-located facilities.

13 Co-located facilities are not one of the 94 that 14 we've looked at, but a co-located facility is a

15 site that is next to or near one of the 94. And we 16 looked at these sites, evaluated them, and our goal

17 would be, for those sites, that we would prevent

18 any risk from exceeding one in 10,000 if we ever

19 discover risk in the future or if there is

20 contamination or something that would be there that

21 we reevaluated and found that we had a problem.

22 The same thing for those same sites, we would want

23 to make sure that we would never exceed a hazard

24 quotient greater than one of those near or next to 25 sites.

Page 26

1 alternatives and explain why and then receive your

2 comments.

When we started looking at remediation
alternatives, the first thing that we had to do was
to develop remedial action objectives. In other
words, these would be the goals that would be
required to be met for whatever alternative that we
were to pick.

9 We divided the eight sites up into
10 different groups. The first group was the soil
11 contaminated sites. There are actually two types
12 of soil contaminated sites. We have the
13 radionuclide contaminated sites and the
14 nonradionuclide contaminated sites.

15 For both those groups of sites, our goal
16 that would be required to be met that we would be
17 required to reduce the risk from the exposure of
18 cesium and radium to less than one in 10,000. And
19 that would be for both future residents and it
20 would also be for the occupational workers.

For the site that was contaminated with lead, we needed to -- our remedial action objective for that site was to prevent direct exposure to lead greater than 400 milligrams for kilograms.

The site that had the mercury contamination, we

1 Also, our goal would be that if we ever

2 found a site, a co-located facility site that had a3 problem, that had excessive risk, our goal would be

4 that we would go in and clean it up and would

5 remediate that facility. And we would remediate it

6 to levels that would be an acceptable risk.

After we developed the goals, then we 8 evaluated each remediation alternative, and we had 9 a set of criteria that we evaluated them to compare

10 each one with. These are criteria that are

11 required by law that we look at and evaluate our

12 remediation activities to.

There is actually nine of them. The first two we call threshold criteria. A threshold criteria are those criteria that would have to be met for whatever remedy that we were to pick. The threshold criteria are to protect the human health

18 and the environment. And then that would be for

19 both groundwater contamination and surface

20 contamination. And whatever we would pick, it 21 would also have to apply to laws, and that would be

21 would also have to apply to laws, and that would be 22 federal laws and state laws.

The next group of criteria that we compare with is that remedies' ability to fall into this group that we call the balancing criteria.

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1 These are comparative type criteria that we compare

2 each alternative to. We have the long-term

3 effectiveness, which would be for future residents,

4 whatever criteria that we would pick, how does it 5 impact future residence.

We had the short-term effect, that would 7 be for the construction workers, the current 8 workers that are there. We'd look at that 9 remedies' ability to reduce the toxicity, the 10 mobility of the contamination or the volume 11 through treatment.

12 We'd also look and see how easy it would 13 be to implement the alternative. The last one is 14 the cost. We look at the cost of whatever the 15 remedy would be and we compare that with each.

After we have compared these, there are 16 17 two other criteria that we had and that is what we 18 call the modifying criteria. Whatever remedy that 19 we were to pick, that remedy would have to have 20 acceptance by the state. It also would be required 21 to have the community acceptance. That is one of 22 the reasons that we're here tonight. We want to 23 tell you what alternatives we looked at, which one 24 we recommend so that we can get your acceptance.

We're going to look at the soil sites

Page 30

1 first, both the nonradionuclides contaminated and 2 the radiological contaminated sites. And one 3 alternative that we looked at was no action. What 4 if we did nothing and just walked away and left the

5 site as it was right now? For every site that we

6 looked at no action, just walking away, would not

7 meet the threshold criteria, so it was immediately

8 dropped.

25

The second thing that we looked at is 10 what we call limited action. Limited action would 11 be actually controlling access to that contaminated 12 site. One of the ways that would control access is 13 that by putting perimeter fencing around it. We 14 would have signs letting anybody know that would 15 come near it that there was a contaminated site

16 there. Also with the signs and the fencing that

17 anything that we would have to do to divert any

18 water shed, we want to make sure that we don't have

19 water running over the site or standing on the 20 site.

21 We also, if necessary, would do deed 22 restrictions. Right now the Department of Energy 23 is controlling, managing the INEEL. If at some 24 time that was turned over to another agency, there 25 would be deed restrictions on record and then even 1 when it was turned back over to the public, just

2 like if you were to build a home, you check the

3 deed and check any deed restrictions that would be

4 on the property. So there would always be

5 something letting people know that there was a

6 problem there.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes. With the

8 institutional control in the limited action, where

9 is the federal government, Department of Energy or

10 whatever, where is the legal requirement to

11 maintain, whether it's a fence -- where is it

12 defined, specifically, what that institutional

13 control includes and where is it legally binding?

14 Would that be in the Record of Decision?

MR. MICHAEL: Records of Decision.

16 AUDIENCE MEMBER: I don't recall that

17 being spelled out, in terms of a legal requirement

18 that they have six foot, you know, galvanized

19 fence. I have never seen it spelled out that

20 way.

15

21 MR. SHAW: I think it would be in the

22 Records of Decision. I don't know how much detail

23 it would go into in the ROD. If it would specify a

24 six-foot fence and culverts every so far, but I

25 think the ROD would be the legal document. The

Page 32

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1 details of it would probably be in the remedial 2 design.

3 AUDIENCE MEMBER: If it's not in the

4 ROD, I mean, it's not going to be legally binding. 5 I read all the RODs and I have never seen it. My

6 point being is, unless those specific aspects of

7 institutional control are spelled out so they are

8 legally binding, it's kind of a meaningless thing

9 to say that, you know, they are going to take care 10 of it for a hundred years, because if in 10 years

11 there is no longer a Department of Energy, and God

12 knows things like that happen, you know, what is 13 the state going to do in order to require the

14 Department of Interior, or whoever else, BLM, might

15 take over that site and say there were commitments

16 made, and they say, "Well, where is it? We don't

17 see it." I'm sorry. Go ahead.

18 AUDIENCE MEMBER: You assume 100 years; 19 is that right?

20 MR. MICHAEL: A hundred years.

21 AUDIENCE MEMBER: After a hundred years,

22 what happens after a hundred years?

MR. MICHAEL: One of the things that we

24 will be doing, if there is any contamination left 25 at the site, would be also to install permanent

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1 markers, like a large concrete marker, like a 2 brass cap that would tell you what was there.

Then one of the points that I also want 4 to bring up, during that 100 years, is that we 5 would also be monitoring that site on an annual

6 basis to make sure that the contamination is not 7 spreading or getting worse. We also, every five

8 years, will evaluate the monitoring and the

9 maintenance of the site, so we'll reevaluate every

10 five years to make sure that the remedy that we

11 picked is still the preferred alternative and is 12 still working.

13 AUDIENCE MEMBER: But I never seen that 14 spelled out in the ROD. What monitoring? What 15 specifically does that mean?

16 MR. GREEN: We will spell it out, like 17 for the diesel site, we have a down-gradient well. 18 So we will say that that well will be monitored

19 biannually for the contaminants concerned or TPH or 20 the total hydrocarbons.

So, if there is a monitoring element in 22 our limited action, the Record of Decision would 23 set that up. If it was just like the signs control 24 on these small burn pits that we would go back out 25 there to keep water from ponding, that will be

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1 contaminated sites. The Water Reactor Research

2 Test Facility burn pits, there is actually one

3 site that we call the burn pits for this, but there

4 is actually four burn pits at that site. Our

5 preferred alternative would be the limited action.

6 That is just what we discussed a few minutes ago

7 about using the perimeter fencing, the signs, the

8 water diversion, we would bring it up to the

9 natural grade and then to continually check it

10 every year, every five years, reevaluate it, but

11 that is our preferred alternative for that site.

Again, if you remember, the primary 13 contaminant of concern for this site was lead that

14 was in the burn pits.

15 The other burn pit, the Technical 16 Support Facility burn pit, our preferred

17 alternative for that site also is limited action.

18 It would be the same type of things that we just

19 discussed about limited action.

20 For the site that was the mercury spill

21 site, we looked at different alternatives for that 22 one. By the way, each one of these alternatives

23 that we looked at are described in detail in the

24 Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study, and they

25 are also described in the proposed plan.

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1 spelled out in the Record of Decision exactly what

2 that limited action means in terms of doing

3 something, in terms of visually going out there and

4 documenting it, if somebody did go out there and

5 kick the tires and look at it. That will be in the

6 Record of Decision, exactly what that monitoring 7 will be.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: That will be a 9 departure from the previous ROD.

MR. GREEN: That is what we intend to 10 11 do.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good. I'll watch and 12 13 wait for it with bated breath.

14 MR. MICHAEL: The next type of 15 alternative that we looked at is containment.

16 Containment could be an engineered barrier. It

17 could be, say, a natural soil covered cap that is

18 some way of containing the contamination if we were

19 to leave it in place. We also looked at different

20 types of excavation and disposal. We looked at

21 different types of excavation and treatment. Again, these are all the different types

23 of alternatives that we looked at for the soil 24 contaminated sites. After all the evaluations --

25 we'll look first at the nonradionuclide

This site, after looking at several

2 different types of alternatives, our recommended

3 alternative for this site would be to excavate the 4 contaminated soil and dispose of it off site. When

5 I say "off site," I mean off the INEEL.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Where would that be?

MR. MICHAEL: It would have to be some

8 place in the county that would have a mercury 9 retort.

10 MR. GREEN: There is one out in

11 California that accepts mercury waste. There is

12 one in Pennsylvania, as long as the radiation

13 levels aren't greater than what they can take in

14 their retort system.

15 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Well, I guess one of

16 the concerns is that it wouldn't go -- you might 17 try to send it to Enviro-Care which is not a RCRA

18 Subtitle C qualifying dump. That is why they are

19 being sued.

20 MR. MICHAEL: I don't believe they

21 have -- this would be to treat the soil. I don't

22 believe they treat mercury contaminated soils. It

23 would have to a facility that actually treats the

24 soils.

25

The last one is the diesel spill site.

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1 After evaluating the different types of

- 2 alternatives for this one, our recommended
- 3 alternative is limited action. If you remember,
- 4 the spill site area was actually between two
- 5 buildings. This soil, it was cleaned up at one
- 6 time, so the first top five feet is clean soil.
- 7 This was where they had a spill in a pipeline leak.
- 8 and it now has approximately five feet of some
- 9 clean soil above it.
- 10 It is also because it's between the
- 11 buildings, it has a roadway and a parking lot on
- 12 top of it, so it also has already, like, a natural
- 13 cap because it's between the buildings. But our
- 14 recommended alternative for this one would be
- 15 limited action. Because it's at the Water Research
- 16 Reactor Test Facility, that facility does have a
- 17 fence already around it, so we would make sure that
- 18 it was still fenced and signed.
- 19 The two soil sites that were
- 20 radiologically contaminated, the first one is the
- 21 soil site that is south of the turntable. This was
- 22 at the Technical Support Facility. Part of it is
- 23 along the edge of the road, part of it is
- 24 underneath the road. We have already done -- at
- 25 the site, we've already done some cleanup through a
- 1 site-wide soil cleanup program. There are still a
- 2 couple spots that are still left. After looking at
- 3 the different types of remedies, our recommended
- 4 remedy would be to go in and physically remove the
- 5 contaminated soil and dispose of it someplace at
- 6 the INEEL at an acceptable facilities.
- 7 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Can you further
- 8 explain that?
- MR. MICHAEL: Right now, it could go to
- 10 either the RWMC, the Radioactive Waste Management
- 11 Facility. There is a program that --
- AUDIENCE MEMBER: Which is not a RCRA 12
- 13 compliant disposal site for mixed low-level waste.
- 14 MR. GREEN: The mixed waste would be low
- 15 level only, so they could go to the RWMC.
- AUDIENCE MEMBER: But it is a mixed 16
- 17 low-level waste.
- MR. MICHAEL: Not this soil area. This 18
- 19 is just a straight low-level waste. 20 MR. GREEN: Do you remember the 106
- 21 removal action that was done at WAG 10 a while
- 22 back?
- 23 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Where was that?
- 24 MR. GREEN: It was site-wide. They went
- 25 across the site and picked up rad soils. They put

- 1 it in a warm waste pond. This was partially
- 2 cleaned up here and there at that time that they
- 3 left -- they did their verification sampling and
- 4 they found some hot spots. That is what we
- 5 removed. It was low level.
- MR. CODY: Did you see in there where it
- 7 said otherwise? In that proposed plan where it
- 8 said otherwise, did you see an indication that this
- 9 was mixed?
- 10 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah. There is a
- 11 number.
- 12 MR. CODY: There are several. There is
- 13 mixed waste.
- AUDIENCE MEMBER: It's also in the site
- 15 treatment plan where it identifies those waste
- 16 streams as mixed low-level waste. You know, if you
- go in and you look at the TCLPs, it clearly exceeds
- 18 the regulatory limits there. I mean, there is no
- 19 question in my mind that it's mixed low-level
- 20 waste. You can't legally put that in anything but
- 21 a RCRA Subtitle C and NRC compliant mixed
- 22 low-level waste disposal site, legally.
- Now, they fought that battle -- we were 23
- 24 talking about this earlier at Hanford -- with the
- 25 same waste streams. The contaminated soil, they
- Page 38
- Page 40 1 are mixed contaminated soils and also there were
 - 2 D&D waste. And the regulators and the public
 - 3 forced DOE to build something called the
 - 4 Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility, which
 - 5 is a RCRA compliant subtitle NRC compliant
 - 6 low-level waste disposal site. That is where they
 - 7 are sending their stuff. You guys at DEQ and EPA
 - 8 are going to lean on these folks and get them to do
 - 9 the same thing because, legally, you can't do the
 - 10 kind of dumping like was done at the TRA, Test
 - 11 Reactor Area, the warm waste pond. And what you
 - 12 want to do at the NRF and also at Argonne, you

 - 13 can't legally do that.
 - MR. GREEN: We're extremely sensitive 14
 - 15 about mixing soils. We know at the RWMC their
 - 16 waste acceptance criteria. You're right, is
 - 17 low-level waste only. We have sites at Test Area
 - 18 North like the soils around the V-Tanks. The rad
 - 19 soils around the PM-2A tanks, we know because the
 - 20 TCE now carry a listed waste code on them. But the
 - 21 sites that we have, we're just talking pure rad
 - 22 soil sites for an on-site disposal.
 - MR. CODY: If it's above a certain
 - 24 regulatory level, it won't go to RWMC, you're
 - 25 right.

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AUDIENCE MEMBER: You've already done 2 it. We've seen you do it. We've seen you try to 3 do it at NRF and here it looks like you're going to 4 try to do it again. You're not defining where this 5 off-site or on-site dump is going to be and whether 6 it's going to become compliant or not. MR. GREEN: I will just reiterate that 8 we won't be taking any mixed soils from, at least,

9 to the RWMC. 10 MR. MICHAEL. The next sites that we

11 would look at --12 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Until you define where 13 you're going to take it, tell us where you're going 14 to take it and be absolutely definitive about where 15 you're going to take it. You can squeak around 16 these kinds of discussions because it's out there 17 in the never-never land, and we won't know until we 18 read the Record of Decision and then it's over. 19 MR. CODY: One thing I can assure you 20 that these discussions are ongoing at the DEQ and 21 have been and are going on as we speak. I mean, 22 this whole issue. It's definitely being discussed, 23 so if you want to talk about it sometime, give me a

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Okay.

24 call.

25

1 Because it's such a large area, the cost associated 2 with actually excavating and disposal could run up 3 to \$20 million, so that is why we want to go ahead

4 and do the additional sampling and analysis and 5 verify and make sure that it is natural occurring.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Is this another 7 example where you have -- what is it called? 8 Uncontrolled RCRA release site, and you're not

9 going to do anything about it, essentially. And 10 this is one of the identified waste streams that is

11 listed in site treatment plan as being a mixed 12 low-level waste. It's real tough to understand how

13 you can justify just walking away from it. MR. GREEN: The portion of the pond that 14

15 we're looking at actually has a waste water land

16 application permit for it now. It's an active 17 pond, so it is a permanent discharge at this time.

18 When they took out the injection well, this is

19 where they started taking the cold waste versus

20 taking it to the injection well.

21 We have not seen any -- we got -- Doug 22 said 45 samples, we actually have 75 samples in the

23 pond. There was no indication that it was a mixed

24 release or mixed waste. I'm not sure on the

25 site-wide treatment plan. The pond is listed as

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2 Facility Disposal Pond, that was the pond that is 3 about a 35-acre at the pond. About five acres of 4 that pond have contaminated soil. The two 5 contaminants of concern of this pond are the cesium 6 and the radium. Just a kind of summary of your 7 previous discussion, the primary contaminate of 8 concern, it would be the radium, that is the risk

MR. MICHAEL: The Technical Support

9 driver, but the data that we have taken, the sample 10 data indicates that the radium that is at the pond

11 is actually natural occurring.

Our plan right now is to continue to 13 sample, to take additional samples both in the pond 14 and outside of the contaminated area and evaluate 15 it and to verify that the radium levels there are 16 natural occurring. If the radium levels are 17 natural occurring through the further sampling 18 analysis, then our preferred alternative would be 19 the limited action. We will put the fences up, the 20 signs as we do with the rest of the sites.

Now, this particular one that if we 21 22 determine that the radium is not natural occurring. 23 but is above natural occurring levels, our second 24 choice, then, would be -- our fall-back position 25 would be to actually excavate and dispose of it.

1 a --

2 AUDIENCE MEMBER: It's listed. It's 3 listed. You did that yourself. I mean, I didn't

4 create that. And you know, now that you mention

5 it, that is really terrible that it's an

6 existing -- it's still in use from the post

7 treatment for the pump and treat that you're 8 dumping, what, 300 picocuries per liter of

9 strontium-95 in there in violation of the

10 Clean Water Act.

11 MR. GREEN: It's nonrad.

12 AUDIENCE MEMBER: I mean, when you 13 continue to put recharged water in there, that is

14 going to only continue the leaching problem of

15 whatever contaminants are in those leach pits. I

16 mean, that is nuts. That is just nuts.

17 MR. GREEN: When they did the

18 investigation of the pond, there were some

19 borings. They went down and -- actually, they are

20 still out there, that was sampled. There was some

21 perched water body or small saturated zone and we

22 didn't find may contaminants in it.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Aluminum, barium, 23

24 mercury, sulfates, they are all real high in your

25 own sampling data.

Page 45 MR. GREEN: The only mercury that I'm 2 aware of that was high, we took one sample out of 3 75 had 67 parts per million, I think --**AUDIENCE MEMBER: How about 4,040?** 5 Aluminum is at 25,400. Barium is at 9,740. 6 Mercury is at 440. Sulfide is at 4,270. MR. GREEN: Right. There was when 8 mercury had an N-flag, which means it was a not a 9 valid data point, so we didn't use it in our 10 assessment of the pond. None of the other mercury 11 levels were that high. 12 MR. CODY: Do you remember what document 13 that came out of? 14 AUDIENCE MEMBER: The RI/FS. 15 MR. MICHAEL: The other set of sites --16 we talked about the two different types of soil 17 sites. The other sites is the underground storage 18 tanks. The phrase that you see is the V-Tanks. 19 V-Tanks was just a nomenclature, terminology that 20 was used on the drawings and stood for vessels, 21 Vessel 1, Vessel 2 and Vessel 3. And they picked 22 up the nickname of V-Tanks. And then we had PM-2A 23 tanks, which were the two 50,000 gallon tanks, so 24 we're talking two different tank sites here. We did many different remedies, looked 25

Page 47 1 with it and bind the contamination with grout. 2 Grout is like concrete. We looked at that. As we discussed earlier, these contents 4 have high levels of organics. We're not sure what 5 the high levels of organics would do to the 6 grouting process. How hard would the grout get? Right now we have a treatability study 8 going on that we're looking at the effect of 9 organics on grouting. We also looked at in situ 10 vitrification of the tanks' contents, the soils and 11 the tanks themselves. Now, in situ vitrification 12 is a technology where you take graphite rods and 13 electrodes, put them in different arrays around the 14 contamination. You put high current and actually 15 heat up the area, whatever is between those rods, 16 whether it be the soil, whether it be the tanks, 17 the contents, the sludge, it would heat it up hot 18 enough that everything melts and becomes a molten 19 mass. One of the unique features about in situ 20 vitrification is that when you heat it up to where 21 it becomes a molten mass, the PCBs are destroyed, 22 the organics are destroyed. The radiation that you 23 would have in that area that, say, like different 24 hot spots, becomes now a lower-level uniform 25 radiation spread throughout the mass, so the

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1 at many different remedies, alternatives, compared 2 them. Actually the V-Tanks -- what you see here is 3 a summary. We actually looked at 10 different 4 types of remedies with V-Tanks and nine different 5 types with the PM-2A tanks. To summarize the type of remedies that 7 we looked at, we looked at the No Action. That 8 would not meet the threshold criteria, so it was 9 dropped. The limited action that we looked at, 10 again, we discussed quite a bit what limited 11 action is, that would be signs, fencing, annual 12 monitoring, five-year evaluation, controlling the 13 water diversion from being on top of the site. We 14 looked at soil excavation, taking the tanks out and 15 then different locations where you would either 16 treat the contents on the site, treat it off the 17 site and disposal of them on and off. We also looked at soil excavation, 18 19 treating the tank contents, and then we would 20 remove the soil from around the tanks and dispose 21 of it off site, and we looked at disposing of it on 22 site. The in situ treatment that we looked at, we 23 want to point out that in situ would be like

24 grouting the contents in the tanks. There is

25 liquids. There is sludge. You would mix grout

Page 48 1 radiation levels are much lower. This technology has been around for 3 awhile and been used, but the type of technology, 4 the way they place the RODs now, where before they 5 used to put, like, four around, like, a box level 6 around the site. The melt would start at the top 7 and work down. A new technology has been developed 8 now where they actually lay the array of electrodes 9 in a plane configuration. And so when you apply 10 the current, now the melt, when it starts melting, 11 is actually going from the outside and working 12 towards the center, where the old method was from 13 the top down. So by doing this, it's a new 14 technology that appears that you would be able to 15 melt the tanks and not have a problem with, say, a 16 tank building up pressure and exploding, because 17 now the melt is coming in from the sides instead of 18 the top. 19 We are also doing a treatability study. 20 A treatability study is just further studies to 21 test the technology. We're doing a treatability 22 study right now with tanks that are almost full

23 scale. They are about 80 percent full scale just

24 to make sure that this technology does, in fact,

25 melt from the sides, and we don't have any problems

1 with tanks. So that study is going on.

These are the different technologies 2

3 that we've looked at.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: The last time that you

5 tried that, it blew up, that was my understanding.

6 Is that right?

7 MR. MICHAEL: There has been problems in 8 the past with tanks where they melted from the top

9 down. The heat would build up in the tanks. There

10 was no place for the pressure to be released.

11 AUDIENCE MEMBER: With those kind of 12 concentrations of VOCs in there, it's just asking

13 for boom.

14 MR. GREEN: The situation with the tank 15 was more that they actually started heating up some

16 saturated soils. They had a steam flash. It

17 wasn't a tank. It was the soil that got hot,

18 steamed and it poofed. This is a little

19 different. We have dry soil, of course, in terms

20 of -- Dave mentioned it, but there is a big super

21 structure where they will be sitting on top of the

22 tanks while they are melting. We expect to get

23 almost total destruction of the organics in the

24 tanks, but there probably will be some coming off,

25 so we will have a thermal oxidizer sitting on this

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1 with this all-cap treatment system of the tanks 2 will melt. We are very sensitive to that.

3 AUDIENCE MEMBER: That was a solid

4 canopy on the last one, wasn't it?

5 MR. GREEN: At INEEL or at Oak Ridge?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: INEEL. 6

7 MR. GREEN: I think they had one with a 8

canvas fabric type.

MR. SHAW: That is important to 10 remember. Maybe I can explain it a little

11 different. You have the tanks sitting this way,

12 like, it's coming at you. The idea is to get the

13 melt going on either side of it like this. And

14 before you even do that, they will take, like,

15 vibratory beam and puncture the top of the tanks.

16 So what happens, then, you have your tank sitting

17 like this, you melt in from the sides, and it gives

18 the gases a places to go. They will escape -- as

19 you dry out the contents of the tanks, it

20 depolarizes the volatiles and all that, the gases

21 will go straight up through the top.

22 If you can imagine coming down on the

23 top of a tank like that -- I mean, the gases don't

24 have any place to go except straight up through the

25 melt. And that is not a good thing. To avoid all

Page 51 1 that, they have come up with a planar melt where

2 you can, in this, like this, and the gases go

3 straight up the top and get captured in the hood

4 that Tim mentioned.

So you avoid all the problems with 6 pressurizing the tanks. You design into it -- you

7 give the gases a place to go. It's a real neat

8 technology. These folks have a tox operating

9 permit, so the PCBs are not a problem. Like Dave

10 said, the rad is evenly distributed throughout the

11 volume of melt. These guys have vitrified

12 plutonium before. They have done scrap metal.

13 They have done tanks. They have done concrete. It

14 looks real promising.

MR. GREEN: Part of our treatability 15 16 study at Hanford, we will have, I think, it has

17 five vent shafts in the tank that is going to be

18 buried, and we will have pressure transistors in

19 the tank vents, also thermocouples, so we will know

what the pressure is as we start to heat the tank

21 and what the temperature thermals on the tanks

22 were. We are very cognitive of that. It's a

23 problem we had at Oak Ridge and the engineering

24 around it.

25

MR. MICHAEL: After we evaluated the

1 tank sites with the different technologies, we

2 wanted to present to you tonight our preferred

3 alternatives, but we recommend the V-Tanks. Our

4 preferred alternative would be the in situ

5 vitrification. Remember, of course, that takes 6 care of the tanks, the soils around the tanks and

7 the contents. As we just discussed, we are doing a

8 treatability study to test this effect on large

9 tanks.

10 If the treatability study was to fail 11 and show us that you could not vitrify a large

12 tank, then our fall-back position would then be to

13 grout the contents in place, remove the soils

14 around them. The tank would stay there, but the

15 contents and everything would be grouted in place.

16 For the PM-2A tank contents, you

17 remember these were the two tanks that were 18 50,000-gallon tanks. The contents was essentially

19 removed at one time. When we say that, we meant

20 the liquid was like less than an inch deep and

21 diatomaceous earth was put in there to bind up the

22 liquids. Some diatomaceous earth was blown in

23 there. These tanks no longer have any free

24 liquids. They just have the diatomaceous earth in

25 the bottom.

Because they are 50,000-gallon tanks, they are approximately 15 feet in diameter. The tanks sit 10 feet below the surface of the ground. So that layer of diatomaceous earth that has the

5 rad contamination 25 feet below the ground. Our 6 preferred alternative for this tank would be the in

7 situ treatment by putting an inert material either

8 in, say, sand, we could put grout or something in9 there to fill up the void space in the tank and

10 then we would leave it in place and control it with 11 a permanent marker and that sort of thing.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Again, that waste is listed in situ treatment plan as a mixed low-level waste. What your proposing here is a permanent disposal site for mixed low-level waste that does not meet EPA, Subtitle C, requirements or NRC

17 requirement -- well, it might meet NRC for low

18 level, but it definitely does not meet the

requirements, EPA requirements disposal sites.
 You don't have any liners. You don't

21 have any leachate detection systems in there.22 You're not talking about impermeable caps. You

23 know, none of your alternatives meet the legal

24 requirements, whether it's the in situ

25 vitrification or the, you know, the grout. I mean,

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1 AUDIENCE MEMBER: The point is that it's 2 damn hot stuff.

3 MR. CODY: Do you have a point in regard 4 to vitrification?

5 AUDIENCE MEMBER: The point is that this 6 is a mixed waste and you're proposing a permanent

7 disposal site that does not meet the legal

8 requirement for a mixed waste dump. That is the

9 point. It does not meet the legal requirements.

10 You'll have no way of monitoring any kind of

11 leachate problems that might occur there. You

12 know, there is no liner. There are reasons why

13 those regulations require those kinds of

14 construction criteria. There is a reason for

15 that. Look at all the failed rad waste sites,

16 Rocky Flats, that different places like that, you

17 know, where we learned the hard way. They are now

18 Superfund sites having to be cleaned up because

19 they didn't meet -- they didn't have the kind of

20 liners and things like that, impermeable caps and

21 all that sort of thing that we now know you have

22 to have in order to have a reasonably secure

23 repository, permanent repository for this stuff.

MR. GREEN: The vitrification will

25 destroy the organics; there is no doubt. And what

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1 that whole thing about grout, that was, you know,

2 that battle has already been won at Hanford. You

3 know, it's just not acceptable, not to the public

4 and wasn't acceptable to the regulators.

You know, you're just not meeting the legal requirements with any of these alternatives

7 that you're proposing. With the V-Tanks, I mean,

8 when I look at the data, it's just awesome with

9 cobalt at 101,000 picocuries per liter,

10 cesium-134 at 16,900, cesium-137 at 12,000,500,

11 europium-152 at 883,000, europium-154 at 938,000,

12 plutonium-237 at 7,000, plutonium-239 at 3,220 --

13 remember that has a 24,100 year half-life -- gross 14 beta at 16,000,000, gross gama at 24,000,000, gross

15 alpha at 19.8, tritium at 11,000,800, total

16 strontium is 1,840,000. It just goes on and on.

17 That was just the V-1. I could go right on down to

18 the V-2, V-3s. V-3s are even worse. Then you get

19 up to, you know, end of the V-9, which is really

20 awesome. V-9, you got americium-241 at 40,200, 21 plutonium-238 at 170,000. Plutonium-239 at 45,300,

22 uranium-233 at 12.4, unranium-234 at 211,000,

23 uranuium-235 6,900, 236 at 3,000, cesium at

24 6,370,000, tritium at 353,000,000.

MR. CODY: Chuck, what is the point?

Page 56 1 is not destroyed, we will pick up in the off-gas

2 system, so there are no organics left. After the

3 glass is allowed to cool -- and this will be a

4 glass monolith. We will go down and get down to

5 the bottom of it. We will take samples to verify

6 that there is some cadmium as a hazardous waste, 7 too, for metal, cadmium, that we can do TCLP and

8 see the leachability of this monolith. If it's

9 determined that the leachability doesn't pass

10 criteria, it will be dug up. But this will be a 11 big, huge piece of glass.

12 AUDIENCE MEMBER: You have more than 13 cadmium. You have about 37 different chemicals

14 that exceed the TCLP.

MR. GREEN: That's characteristic for metals.

17 AUDIENCE MEMBER: It's one of them.

MR. GREEN: It's one of them. But we

19 will test the glass model after it's done and it's

20 cooled. One of the real -- you've read it, and you

21 see the problem. You have PCB waste in there. We

22 have an effluent waste in there. We have a

23 characteristic hazardous. We have tritium. We

24 have very, very high radionuclides, so when you

Nancy Schwartz Reporting (208) 345-2773

1 that waste. Well, you can say I have to incinerate

- 2 to meet the standards for the organics, so you
- 3 incinerate some. You have your tritium.
- 4 You have all your rad. The treatment for that,
- 5 sequentially, to meet everything is just horrific,
- 6 and you're going to create almost a waste stream
- 7 that is great as what you stored it with, just with
- 8 your surface equipment stuff. It's a terrible
- 9 mixed waste, and you're very limited to what you
- 10 can ultimately do with a waste like that,
- 11 regulatory-wise and also engineering-wise.
- 12 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Well, I'll tell you,
- 13 there is a lot of us on the public side that think
- 14 that whole approach is really bogus and does not
- 15 really address the real problems because,
- 16 obviously, you know, the purely radioactive parts
- 17 are still in sort of a regulatory never-never
- 18 land. RCRA is the only one that really keeps your
- 19 feet to the fire in some of these things, but we
- 20 see your treatment, your whole treatment approach
- 21 is that to try to get rid of the RCRA stuff so
- 22 you're back in the loosey-goosey area of rad waste
- 23 where you can do darn near what you want and get
- 24 away with a lot of things.
- MR. GREEN: Well, incineration meets the 25

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- 1 treatment standards for organics and the PCBs, so
- 2 we're meeting the required RCRA standards for the
- 3 treatment of those two waste streams. The
- 4 radionuclides, as you know, they are going to be
- 5 there in this glass monolith.
- AUDIENCE MEMBER: For thousands and
- 7 thousands of years, a good deal longer than any
- 8 kind of institutional control is going to be there
- 9 to deal with it, any commitment to institutional
- 10 control.
- 11 MR. MICHAEL: To summarize what we have 12 done tonight, we have talked about the history of
- 13 the site. We have talked about the evaluations
- 14 that was performed. We talked about the eight
- 15 sites and described them. We talked about the
- 16 alternatives that we have looked at to address
- 17 those sites, and then we've talked about what we
- 18 feel and what to present to you as our recommended
- 19 alternatives so we can get your response and get
- 20 your questions.
- 21 The total capital cost for addressing
- 22 these eight sites is \$25.8. I kind of mention this
- 23 where we're at right now. The proposed plan has
- 24 been presented to the public so that you can review
- 25 this. Our next step now is to collect all the

- Page 59
- 1 comments and develop the Record of Decision. The
- 2 Record of Decision will be finalized in the fall of
- 3 this year, is the current schedule. And as soon as
- 4 the Record of Decision is finalized, the next step
- 5 is when the remediation remedial design starts to
- 6 support the remedial activities. I'm going to turn it back over to Erik
- 8 now.
- MR. SIMPSON: During the presentation
- 10 you-all asked questions. Are there any other
- 11 questions that you would like to focus toward our
- 12 presenters?
- 13 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah. I would like to
- 14 know why the ANP cask storage pad wasn't included.
 - MR. GREEN: The dry storage pad?
- 16 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah, I think so. I
- 17 mean, you got pretty high gross alpha, gross beta,
- 18 cesium. I mean, it's a hot spot.
- 19 MR. GREEN: If it is the dry storage
- 20 cask where they are doing experiments, that is a
- 21 radiologically managed area an IMA or a controlled
- 22 area. We have no evidence that there is -- if
- 23 you've seen it, it's just literally a concrete pad
- 24 with the rad fence around it, and they have these
- 25 casks over there, and they are doing experiments, I

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- 1 guess, for dry storage. I'm not sure what they do,
- 2 but there is no releases out past the concrete.
- AUDIENCE MEMBER: The gross beta is
- 4 25,600 picocuries per gram. Cesium is 30,400.
- MR. GREEN: That must not be the same
- 6 pad because this you can walk right up to it and 7 look at it.
- AUDIENCE MEMBER: It's called ANP Cask
- 9 Storage Plant, ANP, Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion.
- 10 MR. CODY: Cask storage plant? You were
- 11 asking why that wasn't included?
- AUDIENCE MEMBER: The Area 10 reactor 12
- 13 vessel burial site wasn't included. I mean, you
- 14 got a buried reactor core in its shield plug there,
- 15 and you're not even including it in this RI/FS.
- 16 You can't call it a comp plan. It isn't a comp
- 17 plan. 18 MR. GREEN: It's included in it. It's
- 19 just a No Action Site. I don't know if "core" is
- 20 the right word.
- 21 MR. MICHAEL: It's a core vessel. It's
- 22 a reactor core vessel. It was stored in it. The
- 23 core is not there.
- 24 AUDIENCE MEMBER: But those are still
- 25 really hot. The point is that, yeah, you took some

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1 soil samples at five feet, but you got to go back

2 in there and do soil sampling clear to the bottom

3 of those things in order to offer the public any

4 kind of reassurance that a No Action is the

5 appropriate way to go.

15

25

MR. GREEN: When you look at the 7 borings, the way the vessel -- there was an 8 underground storage tank, they cut off the top and 9 put it in the ground and they used it to put it in 10 there and they put the plug and put a dog house on 11 top of it. It's wedged in there, so it isn't a 12 tank where we have sampled around it, and we got, I 13 think, a little further than five feet. Obviously, 14 we never got under it.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Which is where you 16 got to go in order to have any kind of assurance 17 that it's not a release problem, but there again, 18 you go back to the mercury that was used as 19 shielding and those things. You're going to have 20 real serious potential problems with mercury as 21 well, so it's going to be another mixed low-level 22 waste scenario. Again, it doesn't meet any of 23 the legal criteria for mixed low-level permanent 24 disposal sites.

The TAN pool, storage pool.

1 it's probably leaked like hell and for the same

2 reason that is why it's being shut down. There is

3 a whole program to empty the pool of all the TMI

4 waste and whatever else is in there and get it in

5 the dry storage and D&D, the pool.

MR. GREEN: That is part of that 7 agreement, but we have set remedial action

8 injections for these co-located facilities, so when

9 the facility is taken out in the year 2015, or

10 whatever the agreement says, and they take the

11 building down as to whether it has any utilization,

12 we will ensure that there is no contaminants of 13 concern that exceed risk levels there. So we

14 monitor wells down-gradient currently now. We look

15 for tritium there. And if there is a release, it

16 will be like the reactor vessels, it is going to go

17 straight down. And that will be the time that we

18 do it, but the pool level is monitored continually,

19 although it is a single-walled pool.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: It's just about as 20 21 effective as the ECF is. That's why it's a

22 noncompliant facility, and that is why 603 was shut

23 down. It was noncompliant. You can't say it

24 doesn't leak because you really don't have a system

25 in place that can really accurately track whether

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Page 64 1 you've got leaks or not. The only way that you can

2 track whether a facility is leaking is when you

3 have a credible -- a liner system in there and any

4 kind of monitoring of what gets through the liner

5 into a secondary containment. I mean, if you don't

6 have that, you don't have a really reliable system

7 that is going to make any sense to me that you

8 could say that the thing doesn't leak.

MR. GREEN: Well, like I said, we do the

10 monitoring, so we know what water is put in the 11 pool and how much is left. We know evaporation

12 rates, so we know it's not leaking like a sieve. I

13 can assure you that we're very sensitive to this

14 because I worked back at the Brookhaven project.

15 We went over there when they had the problems with

16 their leaking pool there, so we're very cognizant

17 that we need to be very diligent to make sure that

18 that pool is not leaking so we end up now in a

19 tritium plume or in the gravel out there. So we

20 don't see it in our down-gradient wells. The pool 21 levels monitored -- I guess, in term the of DOE's

22 operational guidelines -- sufficiently to say that

23 it's not leaking or it's not leaking a significant

24 amount. It's concrete, and concrete over time

25 will --

4 there was some questions raised, essentially 5 like you have, how comprehensive are these

MR. GREEN: That is a co-located

2 facility. Dave explained it. What we looked at,

3 when we first started the co-located facility,

6 comprehensive? In other words, can this thing 7 impact your risk assessment, so we looked an the

8 pool. It's obviously monitored for water level.

9 We did a short study -- or I should say -- we

10 looked at the wells down-gradient of the pool. We

11 had historically, to make sure there was no tritium 12 inclusives, that would be what we would see if it

13 was released, but the 607 building itself is

14 included as one of our co-located facilities. That

15 would mean that it has a potential of a release, we

16 have a demonstrated and there is none known, but it

17 was identified as having a potential, which under 18 CERCLA is part of the process.

19 AUDIENCE MEMBER: All right, but there 20 again, you have to do soil sampling around the

21 perimeter in order to be able to -- and you need 22 to put that out, that kind of stuff needs to be in

23 these plans in order for it to be a credible

24 process, but the point is that it's not a compliant 25 facility because it doesn't have any liners, and

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AUDIENCE MEMBER: But you do have a 2 tritium plume.

MR. GREEN: We have a tritium plume that 3 4 emanates from the TSF-05 injection well.

5 AUDIENCE MEMBER: With it being in that 6 close proximity, how can you definitely say that it 7 was just from that injection well? I mean, hell, 8 they are a stone's throw apart.

MR. GREEN: Yeah, but, you know, we had 10 the wells, and we don't see it then we see it, so 11 the plume --

12 AUDIENCE MEMBER: They are huge plumes, 13 particularly the tritium in the VOCs. They are 14 huge.

15 MR. GREEN: Well, it extends down close 16 to two miles, I guess, or just over a mile and a 17 half in length. It's a fairly narrow band. It's 18 not even a half-mile wide. But it's monitored. We 19 have lots of wells, so we know where the plume is.

20 We have a good handle on that. We have been out

21 there for six years.

22 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Oh, well.

23 MR. CODY: I don't know, Chuck, if any

24 facilities like you're talking about -- because 25 we're stuck with stuff that was done two to three

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1 decades, four decades ago, whatever. You don't

2 have walls with those liners on. What we're stuck 3 with in 1998 is verification sampling and borings

4 and all that. Whether we like it or not, those

5 buildings, like 607. Is that what you said?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: 603. 6

MR. CODY: 603. We are stuck with the 7

8 sins of the past with some of those, and that is --

9 I mean, I don't know how you would get a double 10 liner system under a building now. You would have

11 to go in there. If you want to see what is under

12 there, you have to do a complete program of

13 verification sampling and borings and things like

14 that. That is about the only thing that we're left

15 with now.

16 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Well, you say -- I 17 mean, in those specific instances like a building 18 or something.

19 AUDIENCE MEMBER: You say that you're 20 stuck with the sins of the past, but I see you 21 signing off on clean-up proposals that are just 22 reruns of the old way of doing things. You know, 23 what does it take to get you to understand that the 24 subsurface disposal area failed? And there is

1 approach to dealing with radioactive mixed

2 radioactive waste, that that shallow-land burial

3 approach doesn't work. It never has worked. And

4 it certainly isn't going to work in the future,

5 that is why there is regulations out there covering

6 that type of waste. So I don't appreciate what

7 you're saying because you're literally making

8 future clean-up programs as you move through this

process because the proposed plans aren't going to

10 work. They have already failed. That whole

11 approach to the shallow-land burial.

MR. GREEN: There is some difference in, 13 like, for the V-1, 2 and 3 leaving a glass model

14 there versus an area where drums and stuff were

15 tipped over into a hole and the dirt put on top

16 of it. Their transport mechanisms are much 17 different. The glass is essentially like granite,

18 its leachability is extremely high. I can't say

19 that it will last as long as the radionuclides, but

20 it's a fairly durable thing. But, like I said,

21 leaving that there is not real comparable to

22 dumping the drums and documenting sludges in the

23 STA.

24 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Well, it's just like a

25 lot of this untried technology that has floated

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1 around that hasn't gone through, you know, the kind

2 of trials that is really necessary. I mean, look

3 at how badly we got snookered into Pit 9 with

4 untried technology. Oh, yeah, we got this great 5 separations process that is going to do this, that

6 and next thing, and it never worked. We told

you-all way back when that it wouldn't work, but

were you listening? No.

MR. GREEN: The process of getting 10 there, the fact that it failed or is not working as 11 everybody hoped, but the concept of taking this

12 waste and turning into an inert form into a blast 13 is still, to me, a valid way to go at it. The fact

14 that the route that was chosen may not have panned

15 out. That is why we're doing the treatability

16 study up at Hanford to make sure for that, that we 17 can have an extremely high degree of confidence.

18 If we don't know that we can glass those tanks in

19 one good pass, we won't do it because there is too

20 much -- you will have an even worse mess to deal

21 with. How do you remediate something that is half 22 melted and you've lost the integrity of the tank?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Well, I will tell you

24 there are lessons learned in what the approach, the 25 regulators and the public demand of DOE-Richland in

which they stuck with vitrification of everything.
 You know, okay, you want to separate it, whatever

3 you want to do. But you are going to end up with a 4 vitrified final form. And why? You can control a

5 process like a whole lot better when it's in a

5 process like a whole lot better when it's in a 6 manufacturing setting.

When you're talking about in situ vitrification, I mean, you can't really control

9 that very well. And you're not even going to have 10 that good of an idea as to how good the final form

11 was. And the other thing is that when it's

12 vitrified in a plant and then you can take that

13 waste form and then put it in a reasonably secure

14 compliant repository and have that extra level of

15 protection and ability to monitor it so that if it

16 does have problems, you can deal with it.

Your approach, you don't have any of that. That's why they went that way, and I can understand it because there is an awful lot of unknowns. You've got different through-puts and

21 different kinds of waste streams that you have to

22 deal with and all, and all of the variabilities

23 that that is going to put into the equation, in

24 terms of what is your final form going to be and

25 how stable is it going to be. But you can control

1

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1 a lot more of that when you're dealing with a2 plant, a vitrification plant that you can't do with3 in situ.

4 MR. SIMPSON: Chuck, I would like to 5 give the agencies an opportunity to respond to your 6 comments. If you could, make those statements 7 during the comment period, then they will respond

8 to them in the responsiveness summary.

9 AUDIENCE MEMBER: I hope they aren't 10 going to say it again.

11 MR. SIMPSON: You'll submit written 12 comments, though,

13 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Nancy's got it all.

14 MR. SIMPSON: Any other questions before

15 we move on to the comment period?

16 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Do I understand that 17 some of these proposals involve an administrative

18 control or a barrier that will be abandoned after

19 100 years or is the situation -- again, what is the 20 situation going to be after 100 years? Is it going

21 to be one that will just be considered in the

22 future or is it known now that after 100 years what

23 is going to happen is okay?

MR. MICHAEL: One of the things with anything that was left in place will have a

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1 permanent marker, of course, that will last longer
2 then 100 years. That is also one of the reasons

3 why we discussed the deed restrictions also.

4 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Okay. But the things

5 that are there, all of the nonradioactive materials 6 and radium-226 and so on, they won't be very much

7 different after 100 years from the way they are

8 now. If the situation that you're proposing with a

9 permanent marker is okay after 100 years, why isn't

10 it okay now?

11 MR. GREEN: When this was determined, I 12 guess, through the advisory board that 100 years

13 was a reasonable period of time that DOE could

14 assume that they were in control of the site.

15 Whether, in fact, like Chuck said, it's 10 years or

16 500 years, that is fairly uncertain, but number

17 "100" was developed as a consensus that this is a

18 reasonable length of time, but you're right, what

19 would happen to the fences, especially for the

20 metal contaminants, like, they are going to be

21 there regardless if a fence is there. I mean, they

22 aren't going away, so that is good question, but

23 that is just our planning basis. But right now, in

24 terms of looking at these sites, we might not put a

25 fence around the burn pits because DOE has control

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1 there now. So some of these sites, there may be a

2 fence because there may be some lacking of DOE3 control in terms of access of somebody who just

4 wandered on there, I guess.

5 AUDIENCE MEMBER: 1998 -- I guess, as I 6 go over it, it doesn't seem infinitely long ago

7 so -- well, I know you have to come up with some

8 sort of a planning horizon to use. You used 100

9 years. That is essentially the answer. After 100

10 years, let them worry about it then.

11 MR. GREEN: It's as far in the future 12 that I think everybody was comfortable saying that

13 DOE would still be an entity, so it is a plan. But

14 we had input from the Site Specific Advisory Board

15 on that, and I think they determined it was a

16 reasonable length of time.

17 AUDIENCE MEMBER: It was not a consensus 18 decision because they fought that tooth and nail.

19 MR. GREEN: It was a nonunanimous

20 decision, but it was one that was made.

21 MR. SIMPSON: Other questions? With

22 that I would like to open it up for public

23 comment. This is the portion of the meeting where

24 your comments are recorded by our court reporter,

25 and she will record them verbatim. And when you

		Ť	111000W, 10410, 2/20/76
	Page 73		Page 75
	make a comment, please state your name and spell it	1	and Argonne National Laboratory-West until the
	2 and give a street address. This is so we can send	2	2 12th of March. So with that, thanks for coming.
	3 you a copy of the Record of Decision and	3	We will hang around afterwards, if you have any
	Responsiveness Summary where your comments will be	4	other questions.
:	responded to by the agencies.	5	i e
- 1 (5	6	(Meeting concluded at 8:55 p.m.)
11	PUBLIC COMMENT	7	
1	3	8	
9	AUDIENCE MEMBER: Chuck Broscious	9	
	B-r-o-s-c-i-o-u-s, executive director of the	10	
11	Environmental Defense Institute, Post Office	11	
12	2 Box 220 Troy, Idaho 83871.	12	
13	Just to repeat myself, to make sure it	13	
14	gets in the public record. Is the proposed plan	14	
15	for Test Area North, it's not a comprehensive	15	
16	plan. As I mentioned, it didn't include the ANP	16	
17	cast storage pad or the Area 10 reactor vessel	17	
18	burial site or the TAN pool and contaminated soil.	18	!
19	The other proposed actions do not meet	19	
20	regulatory requirements for a permanent disposal	20	
21	site for mixed low-level waste under Resource	21	
22	Conservation Recovery Act, Subtitle C,	22	
23	requirements. And it's truly terrible that the	23	
24	regulators are not forcing the Department of Energy	24	
25	to come up with plans that meet all regulatory	25	
	Page 74		Page 76
1	requirements.	1	STATE OF IDAHO
2	The approach with the same waste streams	2	
3	at Hanford resulted in a much different and	3	• •
4	regulatorily defensible approach, in terms of the	4	
5	Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility, which	5	I, NANCYSCHWARTZ, a Notary
6	is a RCRA, Subtitle C compliant and NRC compliant	6	Public in and for the State of Idaho, do hereby
7	mixed low-level waste site. That is what should be	7	certify:
8	done with this waste. And we'll do our best to try	8	That said hearing was taken down by me
9	to convince you to do it. Thank you.	9	in shorthand at the time and place therein named
10	MR. SIMPSON: Thanks, Chuck. Anyone		and thereafter reduced to computer type, and that
	else? Okay. I would just like to mention that we	11	the foregoing transcript contains a true and
	will hold technical briefings for anyone who would		correct record of the said hearing, all done to the
1	like on this project. Also the comment period	13	best of my skill and ability.
	remains open until March 18th. And if you'd like	14	I further certify that I have no
ľ	to take a proposed plan and provide written	15	interest in the event of the action.
	comments by writing on the comment form attached	16	WITNESS my hand and seal this 20th day
1	and just folding it and placing it in the mail, we	17	of March, 1998.
	will get that as well.	18	Nancy Schwartz Network
19	The next time that we will be here in	19	Nancy Schwartz, Notary Public in and for the
	Moscow will be in May. At this point it's	20	State of Idaho
3			My commission expires:
	of the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant		September 28, 1998
ŀ	Comprehensive Remedial Investigation/Feasibility	23	
			ı
	- · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	24	
		24 25	

1	STATE OF IDAHO
2	County of Ada)
3	
4	
5	I, NANCYSCHWARTZ, a Notary
6	Public in and for the State of Idaho, do hereby
7	certify:
8	That said hearing was taken down by me
9	in shorthand at the time and place therein named
10	and thereafter reduced to computer type, and that
11	the foregoing transcript contains a true and
12	correct record of the said hearing, all done to the
13	best of my skill and ability.
14	I further certify that I have no
15	interest in the event of the action.
16	WITNESS my hand and seal this 20th day
17	of March, 1998.
18	America Should
19	Nancy Schwartz, Notary Public in and for the
20	State of Idaho
21	My commission expires:
22	September 28, 1998
23	
24	
25	

		T000 =-					M	oscow, Idaho,	2/26/98
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